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COMMENTS
The Misappropriation Doctrine After the
Copyright Revision Act of 1976
I. Introduction*
Despite an auspicious debut in International News Service v. As-
sociated Press,' the doctrine of misappropriation2 has led an uncertain
career. Sharply criticized by two of the most eminent jurists of the
century, 3 the reasoning of the INS majority was for decades generally
rejected by the courts. The 1950's saw a resurgence of the doctrine,
occasioned largely by the rise of record and tape piracy, for which it
provided a particularly appropriate basis for relief. Courts that adopted the
misappropriation approach, moreover, were subsequently reluctant to
abandon it, even in the face of Supreme Court decisions that arguably
overruled INS.4
Critics of the misappropriation doctrine contend that it conflicts with a
constitutional policy favoring free access to ideas. Unless the conditions
for protection under the copyright or patent laws have been satisfied, they
argue, a work is placed in the public domain by publication and may be
used or copied with impunity. Defenders of the doctrine, on the other hand,
invoke an author's natural and equitable right to enjoy the fruits of his
creativity free from predatory competitive practices. Viewed as a confron-
tation between positive law and natural law theories of intellectual proper-
ty, the misappropriation controversy revives issues first raised in the
earliest copyright litigation over two centuries ago.
The Copyright Revision Act of 19761 attempts to lay this controversy
finally to rest. Section 301 provides that with respect to works within the
scope of the Act protection equivalent to copyright is governed exclusively
* This Comment has been submitted in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Copyright
Competition at the Dickinson School of Law.
I. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). For the facts of the case, see text at note 60 infra.
2. Broadly defined, misappropriation is the conversion to one's own use and profit of
an intangible trade value created by the labor, skill or investment of another. The doctrine of
misappropriation, as that phrase is used in this comment, refers to the equitable principle, first
articulated in INS, that a commercial enterprise has a proprietary interest in trade values it
has created that is enforceable against competitors. See notes 50-68 and accompanying text
infra.3. Justice Brandeis wrote the dissent in INS; Judge Learned Hand's unflagging
opposition to the doctrine is discussed in the text at notes 69-76 infra.
4. The impact of Sears. Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), on the misappropriation
doctrine is discussed in the text at notes 85-97 infra.
5. 17 U.S.C.A. (Supp. Dec. 1976).
by the Act, and state law that affords such protection is abrogated. In
addition, formalities for securing statutory rights are substantially
liberalized, easing the need for alternative forms of protection.
This comment assesses the impact of the Copyright Revision Act on
the doctrine of misappropriation, focusing on section 301 and its legislative
history. To achieve theoretical perspective, the historical development of
copyright and misappropriation law is first briefly reviewed.
II. The Development of Copyright Law
A. Historical Background of the Positive Law-Natural Law Dichotomy
1. English Origins.-Much of the confusion that has clouded
debate over the nature of copyright protection may be traced to certain
pecularities of the law's historical development. In modern copyright law,
the recognition of an exclusive right of authors to exploit their works is a
device to promote intellectual and artistic activity by enabling authors to
profit from their creative effort. 6 As a legal concept, however, exclusive
rights are considerably older than the modern concern for authorship. The
earliest copyright laws were decrees of sixteenth century English monarchs
whose design was to suppress heretical and seditious writing. The laws'
beneficiaries were the booksellers of London, upon whom those laws
conferred the exclusive right to engage in the art of printing.' With the end
of prepublication censorship in 1694 came the end also of the booksellers'
lucrative monopoly. Left with no statutory remedy against "piracy" of
their books, the booksellers petitioned Parliament for relief, and in 1710
Parliament responded by enacting the Statute of Anne,8 the first modern
copyright law.
9
Naturally, as the first copyrights expired, unauthorized editions
appeared, and the question of an author's rights in his work at common law
arose. The parties in interest were still the booksellers, however, for then as
now economic realities compelled authors to assign their rights to pub-
lishers. After a series of skirmishes in the Courts of Chancery, with
6. The large role played by compulsory licensing in the new copyright law suggests
that emphasis is shifting away from exclusive rights as the primary mechanism for compensat-
ing authors. See Ringer, Copyright in the 1980s, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc. 299(1976). On the
issue of Congress' constitutional power to confer less than exclusive rights, see I M. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7 (1976).
7. In 1557, Mary, the Catholic Queen of England, concerned over dissemination of
Protestant literature and the political unrest it was thought to cause, granted the London
booktrade a royal charter, constituting them the Brotherhood of Stationers with an absolute
monopoly on printing. In 1559, Elizabeth, a Protestant but no less concerned about political
instability, renewed the charter and created the Stationers' Company. The company had
broad powers of search, seizure and imprisonment, supported by Star Chamber decrees.
During the Interregnum, its authority derived from ordinances of Parliament and, after the
Restoration, from the Licensing Act of 1662, 13 & 14 CAR. 2, c. 22. See generally L.
PATrERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPFCTIVE (1968).
8. 8 ANN. I, c. 19 (1709). The discrepancy in date results from a calendar adjustment.
9. The statute's purpose, as stated in its preamble, was "the encouragement of
learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of such copies,
during the terms therein mentioned." Id. Clause I of the Act granted authors and their assigns
a twenty-one year copyright in books published prior to enactment and one of fourteen years
in new books. In the latter case, authors living at the end of the term might renew the copyright
for an additional fourteen years. Id. cl. II.
outcomes uniformly favorable to the booksellers,' 0 the issue was presented
to the King's Bench in Millar v. Taylor." Though Millar purported to
settle the controversy, in fact it succeeded only in imbedding it more firmly
in the body of the law. Plaintiff invoked a concept of property based on
natural law, arguing that as "the labour of a man's body and the work of his
hands . . . are properly his,"' 2 so too are
the labours of the mind and productions of the brain . justly
entitled to the benefit and emoluments that may arise from them
... . [The author] has a moral and equitable right to the profits
they produce. . . forever; and. . . if others usurp or encroach
upon these moral rights, they are evidently guilty of an injustice,
in pirating the profits of another's labour, and reaping where
they have not sown.'
3
In an unusual split decision, the court, led by Lord Mansfield, held that
authors had at common law a copyright in their works that survived
publication' 4 and was unaffected by the Statute of Anne.' 5 As to the effect
of the Statute, Millar was overruled by Donaldson v. Beckeu 6 only a few
years later, but its recognition of an author's natural right to the fruits of his
10. The preliminary injunctions obtained by the booksellers seem always to have been
met with acquiescence. The only appeal to a court of law, Tonson v. Collins, 96 Eng. Rep. 169
(K.B. 1760), was dismissed when the judges learned that the suit was a collusive effort to
obtain a precedent. The Tonson report is valuable, however, in that it reproduces the
arguments of counsel, Blackstone and Yates for plaintiff and defendant respectively, both of
whom figured prominently in later litigation. See notes 12, 14 infra.
I1. 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
12. J. LOCKE, CONCERNING CIVIL GOVERNMENT, SECOND ESSAY, ch. V, para. 26(1690).
Plaintiff's chief counsel was Sir William Blackstone, whose reliance on Locke is revealed by
references in Tonson, 96 Eng. Rep. at 180, and in his Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland,
bk. 11, ch. 26, at 405.
13. 98 Eng. Rep. at 231 (emphasis added). This succinct statement of plaintiff's position
came, ironically, from Justice Yates, who held for the defendant. See note 14 infra. In
characterizing the author's right as perpetual, however, it may go beyond plaintiff's conten-
tion, for Blackstone at least believed that the right could be forfeited by allowing the work to
go out of print or, perhaps, by demanding an unreasonable price. See J. WHICHER, THE
CREATIVE ARTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 115 (1965).
14. The lone dissenter, Justice Yates, conceded that the natural law argument "has
indeed a captivating sound; it strikes the passions with a winning address .... ." 98 Eng.
Rep. at 23 1. He nevertheless concluded that in publishing his work plaintiff had surrendered
control over it and thus also his property interest: "Can he complain of losing the bird he has
himself voluntarily turned out?" Id. Justice Aston observed that publication "is the neces-
sary act, and only means, to render [a work) useful to mankind, and profitable to the owner";
and Aston found "quite harsh and unreasonable" the contention that this very act should
destroy the author's property. Id. at 222. Lord Mansfield found Yates' exegesis on the nature
of property unpersuasive: "The argument turns in a circle. 'The copy is made common,
because the law does not protect it: and the law can not protect it, because it is made
common.' " Id. at 253. The view that publication divests common-law rights nevertheless has
become the prevailing rule in England and the United States. See Jefferys v. Boosey, 10 Eng.
Rep. 681 (1854) (dictum); note 23 and accompanying text infra.
15. The court relied on clause 9 of the Statute, which provided that nothing in the Act
should be construed "either to prejudice or confirm any right.., to the printing or reprinting
[of] any book or copy .... " 8 ANN. I, c. 19, cl. 9 (1709).
16. 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774). The facts of the case were essentially the same as in
Millar. (In fact, the same literary work-James Thompson's The Seasons-was involved in
both cases, Beckett having purchased the rights from Millar's executors.) Plaintiff easily
obtained an injunction, but defendant refused to acknowledge defeat and appealed to the
House of Lords, challenging the authority of Millar. In reversing the decree, the lords
apparently relied on language in the Statute to the effect that copyright endured for the stated
periods "and no longer." 8 ANN. 1, c. 19, cl. 1 (1709). It has been observed that the result
reached in Millar, giving controlling effect to the Act's "saving clause" (see note 15 supra),
was more in accord with standard rules of statutory construction. See M. NIMMER, supra note
6, § 47.2, at 188-89.
creativity was confirmed and stands as the primary source of the positive
law-natural law dichotomy in copyright law.
2. Reception in America.-The question of common-law
copyright arose before the Supreme Court for the first time in Wheaton v.
Peters, 7 a case that through the vagaries of copyright history has come to
stand for a proposition quite different from its actual holding. The decision
rests entirely on the Court's dubious conclusion that no common-law
copyright in published works existed in the forum state of Pennsylvania.t 8
Although it referred favorably to Justice Yates' dissent in Millar, the Court
did not hold that the nature of property, or anything else, precludes the
existence of a common-law copyright in published works.' 9 Although
Donaldson was extensively discussed by counsel, the Court did not find
that either the Copyright Clause20 or the federal copyright law then in
effect 21 operated, in the manner of the Statute of Anne, to divest an author
of his common-law rights.2 2 In short, the Court imposed no limitation on
the power of a state to protect literary property. Indeed, the clear implica-
tion of the majority opinion is that had there been a Pennsylvania court
decision recognizing common-law copyright in published works, the Court
would have been obliged to follow it. Nevertheless, Wheaton "established
the prevailing American view that publication ipso facto divests an author
of common-law copyright protection."
23
17. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). Plaintiff was Henry Wheaton, official reporter for the
Court from 1816 to 1827, and the suit involved the Court's own reports, in which he claimed
both common-law and statutory copyright. Dismissing the common-law count, the Court
remanded the case for a determination as to whether Wheaton had complied with statutory
formalities; but the economic significance for the litigants was substantially diminished by the
Court's holding that its opinions, as opposed to the reporter's notes, were not copyrightable.
18. The Court observed, first, that no Pennsylvania court had ever recognized such a
right and, second, that common-law copyright in published works was a matter of "great
doubt and complexity" in England and ill-adapted for import "into the wilds of Pennsylvania
... Id. at 660. In fact, the right in question had been recognized by the Courts of
Chancery, the King's Bench and the House of Lords and had never been successfully
disputed. James Madison, closely associated with the authorship of the Copyright Clause (see
note 20 infra), had observed that "[t]he copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in
Great Britain, to be a right of common law." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 30 (B.F. Wright ed.
1961). Moreover, as pointed out by Justice Thompson in dissent, the Pennsylvania colony had
in 1718 expressly adopted the prevailing English law. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 688-89. The majority
also underestimated the degree of sophistication attained by the early colonial booktrade. See
J. WHICHER, supra note 13, at 135-37.
19. Justice Thompson's dissent, however, was devoted primarily to rebutting Yates.
20, The Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress shall have power... to promote
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8.
21. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
22. Judge Hopkinson of the Circuit Court of Appeals had based his denial of common-
law protection on the view that the effect of the Copyright Clause was to deliver to the
Congress all authority with respect to copyright. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) App. at 741. This position has
little to recommend it. Unlike the Statute of Anne, which in taking away common-law rights
provided a statutory alternative, the Copyright Clause is a mere grant of power, which
Congress may choose not to exercise. It is inconceivable that the authors of the Clause
contemplated that its inclusion in the Constitution might result in the complete absence of
copyright. Judge Hopkinson's theory, which would also destroy the power of the states to
protect unpublished works, has never gained a following. On the other hand, the idea that
Congress by exercising its constitutional power preempts the copyright field formed the core
of Judge Learned Hand's influential criticism of the misappropriation doctrine. See notes
69-76 and accompanying text infra.
23. M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 47.3, at 190. This is true although so accomplished a
B. The Copyright Act of 1909
1. Scope.-Although the Copyright Act of 190924 purported to
cover "all writings of an author," 25 implying a range coextensive with the
constitutional grant of power, in fact a number of types of works qualifying
under the Constitution have been held at one time or another to fall outside
the scope of the statute.2 6 The constitutional phrase has been construed to
require "originality" and "tangibility." The former, derived from use of
the word "author," is generally defined as meaning simply an absence of
copying-i.e., that the work is original with the creator. 27 The latter is
generally interpreted as demanding fixation, if only momentary, in some
physical form. 28 In addition, there is frequently added a requirement of a
modicum of intellectual labor, usually included in the criterion of "origi-
nality," but more accurately a means of excluding de minimis creations,
such as collocations of two or three words 29 or forms of expression dictated
by functional considerations. 30 The courts interpreted the copyright statute
much more narrowly. Thus fabric designs, 31 titles,32 choreography 33 and
typography 34 have been held uncopyrightable.
35
legal scholar as Judge Learned Hand was as late as 1940 "unable to discover any case which
squarely presented the situation." Fashion Originators Guild of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80,
83 (2d Cir. 1940). See also Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899). In Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546 (1973), the Supreme Court held that states were free to accord published works
copyright protection that did not actually conflict with federal law. See notes 96-97 and
accompanying text infra.
24. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, as amended, codified at 17 U.S.C.
(1970) (enacted into positive law by Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391,61 Stat. 652). Although the
provisions of the 1909 Act are referred to in the past tense, the reader is reminded that the Act
continues in force through December 31, 1977.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
26. The outstanding example is the case of sound recordings, which were not copyright-
able before the Sound Recordings Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391. See
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
27. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
28. See M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 8.32.
29. Smith v. Muehlebach Brewing Co., 140 F. Supp. 729 (S.D. Mo. 1956).
30. E.H. Tate Co. v. Jiffy Enterprises, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 571 (E.D. Pa. 1954). The
exclusion from copyright of merely functional language is closely related to the proposition,
now axiomatic, that ideas cannot be copyrighted. Thus, if the subject matter involved is so
narrow that only a limited number of forms of expression are possible, even verbatim copying
may not be actionable. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir.
1967) (contest instructions). A doctrine based on the Supreme Court decision in Baker v.
Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), holds that in certain cases copying is privileged if done "for use"
(using the "idea") and not "'for explanation" (using the "expression"). Thus, copyright in a
dress design will prevent others from making unauthorized drawings of the design but not
from duplicating the design in competing dresses. J. Adelman, Inc. v. Sonner's & Gordon,
Inc., 112 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). See generally M. NiMMER, supra note 6, § 27.
31. Kemp & Beatley, Inc. v. Hirsch, 34 F.2d 291 (E.D.N.Y. 1929). Fabric designs are
now copyrightable, Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 334
(S.D.N.Y. 1960), but questions remain as to what constitutes adequate notice. See H.M.
Kolbe, Inc. v. Armgus Textile Co., 315 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1963).
32. Becker v. Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1943).
33. "[C]horeographic works which do not tell a story, develop a character or emotion,
or otherwise convey a dramatic concept or idea, are not subject to registration" as dramatic or
dramatico-musical compositions, even though fixed in film or notation. 37 C.F.R. § 202.7
(1976). Registration as a film or book would not protect against infringing performances.
34. Copyright Office Regulations deny copyright to "mere variations of typographic
ornamentation, lettering or coloring," id. § 202.1(a), although typography with the requisite
"originality" is certainly possible, and copyright protection has on occasion been extended.
See, e.g., Amplex Mfg. Co. v. A.B.C. Plastic Fabricators, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa.
1960). Relief may also be available under the misappropriation doctrine. See note 95 infra.
35. Relying on Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), courts have refused protection to
contracts, insurance policies and other legal documents. See, e.g., American Inst. of
Exclusive rights granted copyright owners under the 1909 Act in-
cluded the right "to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend" their work,' 6
to adapt it, 37 or to perform it publicly for profit. 31 Performance rights in
dramatic works extended to performances not for profit as well. 39
The term of copyright protection under the 1909 Act was twenty-eight
years, renewable for another twenty-eight. 4°
2. Notice and Registration .- To secure for himself the benefits of
copyright protection, the copyright owner had generally to affix to the
original and to published copies of his work notice of copyright that
conformed to the standards set in the statute and the regulations. 4' Failure
to provide notice, or a mistake in the form or position of this notice, could
result in passage of the work into the public domain.
42
The statute also required registration of the work with the Copyright
Office and deposit of copies or other materials as a condition precedent to
maintenance of an infringement suit.43 Failure to comply did not forfeit
protection, however, unless the Register of Copyrights demanded de-
posit.44
3. Section 2 and Publication.-Section 2 of the 1909 Act provided
that nothing in the Act should be construed as limiting an author's rights at
common law to protection of his unpublished work. 45 Little was accom-
plished thereby to resolve the natural law-positive law copyright
dichotomy, for even if section 2 was construed as implying its inverse-i. e.,
that limitations are imposed on common-law rights in published works-
no indication was given what the nature and extent of those limitations
might be. Furthermore, the Act provided no definition of publication,
46
and "an operative and consistent definition of the term has eluded both the
Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). But cf. Continental Casualty Co. v.
Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958) (denial of protection based on finding of publication),
noted at 47 CALIF. L. REV. 174 (1959).
36. 17 U.S.C. § l(a) (1970).
37. The statute enumerates specific rights, such as the right to translate the work, to
dramatize it or to convert it into a novel. Id. § 1(b) (1970).
38. Id. § 1(c), (e). If the owner of a copyright in a musical composition acquiesced in its
recording, others might also record it upon payment of 2C royalty per record. Rendition of a
musical composition by coin-operated machines did not constitute performance for profit
unless a fee was charged for admission to the place of rendition.
39. Id. § I(d).
40. Id. § 24.
41. Id. §§ 19, 20; 37 C.F.R. § 202.2 (1976).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1970). Accidental omission of notice from "a particular copy or
copies" did not forfeit all protection if the copyright owner "sought to comply" with the law,
but prevented recovery from an innocent infringer misled by the omission; and the court,
before issuing an injunction, might require the copyright owner to reimburse the infringer for
his "reasonable outlay innocently incurred." Id. § 21.
43. Id. §§ 11, 13.
44. Id. § 14.
45. Id. § 2.
46. Section 26 of the Act defined the "date of publication" as "the earliest date when
copies of the first authorized edition were placed on sale, sold, or publicly distributed by the
proprietor of the copyright or under his authority .... "Id. § 26. The courts, however, have
interpreted the section as fixing the date from which the copyright term begins to run and not
as providing a general definition. Patterson v. Century Productions, 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir.
1937).
state and federal judiciaries." 47 Ambiguity in the use of the word is not
surprising in light of its having been called upon to serve three distinguish-
able functions: first, to mark the point at which a york is dedicated at
common law; second, to divest common-law rights by action of the statute;
and, third, to satisfy a condition of copyright vesting in its owner.48 Courts
have not applied a given definition uniformly over the three functions.
Judge Frank has observed that many courts will deliberately apply a more
lenient standard of publication in order to vest a plaintiff with statutory
rights and, on the same facts, find a mere "limited publication" when to do
otherwise would leave the plaintiff without any protection.
49
III. The Misappropriation Doctrine
A. Foundation in the Judicial Conscience
The misappropriation doctrine is a branch of the law of unfair
competition5 ° and shares with it a common origin in "the conscience,
justice and equity of common-law judges." 51 Competition is itself a legal
relationship giving rise to reciprocal rights and obligations;52 and among
these is the duty of each participant in the commercial struggle, in striving
for a winning advantage, to employ only "the honestly exercised means of
his own strength, ingenuity, skill, and capital." 53 Among the practices first
proscribed as unfair competition was "passing off," 54 and the courts'
condemnation of such trading on the goodwill earned by a competitor55
47. Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUM. L. REV.
49, 50 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein, Federal Ordering].
48. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1970).
49. American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1956). A limited
publication is one that "communicates the contents of a manuscript to a definitely selected
group and for a limited purpose, and without the right of diffusion, reproduction, distribution
or sale .... " White v. Kimmel, 193 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1952).
50. The term "unfair competition" is used by the courts in two quite different ways. In
a substantial number of jurisdictions, it is regarded merely as another name for "passing off."
See note 58 and accompanying text infra. As it was used by the late Rudolf Callmann,
however, in his definitive work on the subject, unfair competition embraces a wide range of
objectionable practices, including trade disparagement, boycott, price war, commercial
bribery and coercion, false advertising (including "passing off") and misappropriation. In
this comment, Callmann's usage is adopted and heavy reliance is placed on his theories as
well. See generally R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES (3d ed. 1968).
51. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 792,
101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 488 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
52. See I R. CALLMANN, supra note 50, § 3.1.
53. Id. § 6.2(d), at 178. The requirement that competitors rely on "constructive effort"
is characterized by Callmann as the "pole-star" of the law of unfair competition. Id. at 177.
54. In "passing off" (also called "palming off") one party seeks to divert to himself the
goodwill enjoyed by another by merchandising his own products in a way likely to deceive
consumers into believing that they originated with the other. A leading American case is
Singer Mfg. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
55. Early cases demanded that the parties be in direct competition, but this requirement
has been considerably relaxed. Compare Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk
Co., 201 F. 510 (7th Cir. 1912), with Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509 (6th Cir.
1924). See generally I R. CALLMANN, supra note 50, § 5. As the competitive relationship
between the parties becomes more indirect, the commercial injury consists less in the
diversion of goodwill and the business attached to it and becomes more a matter of injury to
the goodwill itself. Such cases are more properly the subject of trademark and tradename law.
For an interesting discussion of the "copyright-trademark interface," see Laff and Saret,
Further Unraveling of Sears-Compco: Of Patches, Paladin and Laurel & Hardy, 7 Loy. CHI.
L.J. 33 (1976).
reflects the ethical dimension of unfair competition 56 and the law's
emphasis on the necessity for independent exertion. 57 But unfair competi-
tion is not limited to "passing off" 5 8 and comprises "any violation of a
right arising from the operation of an established business. "59
B. International News Service v. Associated Press
In International News Service v. Associated Press6' the Supreme
Court extended the law of unfair competition beyond "passing off" to
include what has come to be known as "misappropriation' '--the exploita-
tion of the investment, labor or skill of another by marketing as one's own
the product of the other's effort. 6 1 AP was a large, international organiza-
tion in the business of gathering news for the use of its member newspa-
pers. INS, also a large news-gathering organization, copied news from AP
bulletin boards in New York and wired it to clients on the west coast, who
thus were able to publish AP news in competition with AP members. The
Court quickly noted that the issue was not one of copyright, although AP's
dispatches were copyrightable in theory, for the protection sought was not
of the particular expression used in the dispatches but of the news itself,
which was clearly not copyrightable: "It is not to be supposed that the
framers of the Constitution . . . intended to confer upon one who might
happen to be first to report a historic event the exclusive right for any period
to spread the knowledge of it. "62 The issue, the Court concluded, was one
of
unfair competition in business. And, in our opinion, this does not
depend upon any general right of property analogous to the
common-law right of the proprietor of an unpublished work to
prevent its publication without his consent; nor is it foreclosed
by showing that the benefits of the copyright act have been
waived ...
56. The law of unfair competition is governed by "the principles of old-fashioned
honesty." Jewel Tea Co., Inc. v. Kraus, 187 F.2d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 1950). It is "but a
reaffirmation of the rule of fair play." Shrout v. Tines, 260 S.W.2d 782,788 (Mo. App. 1953);
Bard-Parker Co. v. Crescent Mfg. Co., 174 Misc. 356,20 N.Y.S.2d 759(Sup. Ct. 1940). "The
tendency of the law 'has been in the direction of enforcing increasingly higher standards of
fairness or commercial morality in trade.' "Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 206 F.2d 144,
145 (3d Cir. 1953) (quoting 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, introductory note to ch. 35, at 540).
57. "It cuts across the grain of justice to permit an intruder to profit not only by the
efforts of another but at his expense as well." American Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255,
271-72 (2d Cir. 1959). In Goldstein v. Garlick, 65 Misc. 2d 538, 318 N.Y.S.2d 370 (Sup. Ct.
1971), the gravamen of a complaint in unfair competition was identified as the "misappropria-
tion of a commercial advantage belonging to another." Id. at 540, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 373.
58. As observed in note 50 supra, many courts treat "passing off" and unfair competi-
tion as synonymous. See, e.g., White Tower System v. White Castle System of Eating Houses
Corp., 90 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1937) (unfair competition a "convenient name" for passing off).
Such an equation does not necessarily mean that other unethical business practices are not
actionable-merely that they are not grouped under the rubric "unfair competition." Adher-
ence to the older usage may indicate a court's conservatism, however, and "general hostility
to new trends in the law of torts." Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Pub. Co., 46 F.
Supp. 198, 203 (D. Mass. 1942) (characterizing Massachusetts law).
59. House of Westmore, Inc. v. Denney, 151 F.2d 261, 265 (3d Cir. 1945).
60. 248 U.S. 215 (1918), aff'g, 245 F. 244 (1917), modifying 240 F. 983 (1917).
61. Misappropriation has been called "upside-down passing off." Chafee, Unfair
Competition, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1310(1940). In A.L.A. SchecterPoultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the Supreme Court described INS as extending unfair competi-
tion to "misappropriation of what equitably belongs to a competitor." Id. at 532.
62. 248 U.S. at 234.
. .The question here is not so much the rights of either
party as against the public but their rights as between them-
selves. . . . And although we may and do assume that neither
party has any remaining property interest as against the public in
uncopyrighted news matter after the moment of its first publica-
tion, it by no means follows that there is no remaining property
interest in it as between themselves.
63
Thus, the Court stated unequivocally that the competitive relationship
between the parties was the critical factor that gave rise to the plaintiff's
"quasi property"' in its news dispatches. The Court also called attention
to the plaintiff's considerable investment and the consequent unfairness of
defendant's appropriation:
[D]efendant, by its very act, admits that it is taking material that
has been acquired by complainant as the result of organization
and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and which is
salable by complainant for money, and that defendant in appro-
priating it and selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap where it
has not sown. . . .The transaction speaks for itself, and a court
of equity ought not to hesitate long in characterizing it as unfair
competition in business.
65
To an unfortunate degree, language in the decision emphasizing the
plaintiff's "unjust enrichment' 66 has been more successful in capturing
the attention and imagination of later courts and writers than the reliance on
the competitive relationship as an essential element in plaintiff's cause of
action. Indeed, even in the dissent by Justice Brandeis, no effort was made
to deal with the notion of quasi property, valid only as against a com-
petitor. Instead Brandeis compared the protected interest to recognized
categories of property and measured defendant's conduct against recog-
nized forms of unfair competition. From neither perspective could he find a
basis for relief:
To appropriate and use for profit, knowledge and ideas produced
by other men, without making compensation or even acknowl-
edgement, may be inconsistent with a finer sense of propriety;
but, with the exceptions indicated above, the law has heretofore
sanctioned the practice.
67
63. Id. at 235-36.
64. Id. at 242. The Court took note of the "rule that a court of equity concerns itself
only in the protection of property rights," but observed that the rule "treats any civil right of a
pecuniary nature as a property right. . . and the right to acquire property by honest labor or
the conduct of a lawful business is as much entitled to protection as the right to guard property
already acquired." Id. at 236 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 239-40.
66. The INS court was not the first to condemn those who reap where they have not
sown. See cases collected and discussed in 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 50, § 61.1.
67. 248 U.S. at 257. Justice Brandeis conceded the palpable injustice of defendant's
conduct but argued that to create a new rule to cover the situation might work serious injury to
the public interest "unless the boundaries of the right are definitely established and wisely
guarded." Id. at 262-63.
Courts are ill-equipped to make the investigations which should precede a
determination of the limitations which should be set upon any property right in
news . . . . Courts would be powerless to prescribe the detailed regulations
essential to full enjoyment of the rights conferred or to introduce the machinery
required for enforcement of such regulations.
Id. at 267. One interesting solution suggested by Brandeis as within the power of the
legislature, but not the courts, was a system whereby the news would be protected only if the
Given his basic refusal to respond to the majority's admittedly innovative
argument, Brandeis' logic is unassailable, and the seeming inevitability of
his conclusion may have been a major reason for the cool reception
accorded INS in the lower courts.
68
C. Learned Hand and the Theory of Constitutional Preemption
While the impact of the Brandeis dissent on later decisions is
conjectural, there is little doubt that enormous influence was exerted by the
consistent and articulate opposition of Judge Learned Hand in a series of
opinions stretching over twenty-five years.69 INS, Hand contended, was
confined to "situations substantially similar to those then at bar. The
difficulties of understanding it otherwise are insuperable." 7" Like Bran-
deis, Hand analyzed the INS decision in the light of traditional concepts
and concluded that its effect was "to create a sort of common-law patent or
copyright for reasons of justice." 71 Like Brandeis, Hand regarded the
granting of relief in such a situation as more properly a matter for the
legislature.72 Unlike Brandeis, however, Hand also discerned grave con-
stitutional objections to the misappropriation doctrine.
Hand was the foremost spokesman for the theory of constitutional
preemption, which held that the exercise by Congress of its power under
the Copyright Clause destroys the ability of the states to protect published
"writings." Once it is settled, Hand argued, that a work is a "writing,"
the Clause forces upon the author the choice between such circumscribed
exploitation as does not constitute publication and dedication of his work to
the public. 73 A contrary interpretation, Hand reasoned, would permit the
states to confer perpetual protection on works and thus "defeat the
gatherer assumed the duty of selling it at a reasonable price to all newspapers who desired it.
Thus Brandeis was among the first to realize that the public interest in free access might
require a new system for protecting literary property and to suggest as a possible solution a
form of compulsory licensing. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
68. It has been suggested that "[t]he federal judiciary was particularly proud of the role
it played in the halcyon years before Erie [v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)] as creator of
broad, equitable doctrines of unfair competition." Price, The MoralJudge and the Copyright
Statute: The Problem of Stiffel and Compco, 14 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYM. 90, 93 (1966).
Significantly, however, no cases are cited between the years 1918 and 1938. In fact,
"'subsequent cases exhibit a lack of judicial enthusiasm for a full extension of (the INS]
doctrine." PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106, 113 (S.D.N.Y.
1964). But see notes 76-97 and accompanying text supra.
69. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955)
(dissent); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952); National Comics
Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951); RCA Mfg. Co. v.
Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940); Fashion Originators Guide of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d
80 (2d Cir. 1940); Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
70. Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 281.
73. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir. 1955)
(dissenting opinion). Since publication is set as a boundary line of copyright protection by the
copyright law and not by the Constitution, there would appear to be no reason why the
clause's preemptive effect would not apply to unpublishsd writings as well. Of course, section
2 of the 1909 Act specifically preserves state power over such writings, see note 45 and
accompanying text supra; but earlier copyright acts contained no provision comparable to
section 2, and the validity of common-law copyright was never questioned. See Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
overriding purpose of the Clause, which was to grant only for 'limited
Times' the untrammelled exploitation of an author's 'Writings.' "I'
Another reason for preemption, Hand felt, was the need for uniformity,
"one of the principal interests to be gained by devolving upon the Nation
the regulation of this subject." 7 5
D. Rise of the Misappropriation Doctrine in Recent Decades
Hand's last and, perhaps, most complete and articulate statement on
the misappropriation issue was given, significantly, in dissent. 76 The shift of
opinion on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, moreover, was
mirrored in the state and federal judiciary at large. First, the rapidly
expanding role of communications in modern life was rendering the
Copyright Act of 1909 ever more conspicuously obsolete.7 7 Second, the
judiciary began to show an increasing reluctance to rest content with
Hand's Olympian attitude that, while "[i]t seems a lame answer in such a
case to turn the injured party out of court, . .. there are larger issues at
stake than his redress," 78 and the courts displayed a corresponding
willingness to convert the judicial conscience into decisional law. 79 The
decision of the Supreme Court in INS became a symbol of "the law's
capacity for growth in response to the ethical, as well as the economic
needs of society."- 80 INS gained an increased following, but not on the
basis of its actual contribution to the law-the notion of quasi property
valid only as against a competitor. Instead INS was cited as general
authority for the proposition that
the law of unfair competition does not rest solely on the ground
of direct competitive injury, but on the broader principle that
property rights of'commercial value are to be and will be pro-
tected from any form of unfair invasion or infringement and
from any form of commercial immorality, and a court of equity
will penetrate and restrain every guise resorted to by the
wrongdoer.
81
By abandoning the requirement of competition,8 2 and relying wholly on a
theory of "unjust enrichment," courts made relief against misappropria-
74. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir. 1955)
(dissenting opinion).
75. Id. For a thorough examination of Hand's theory, see Goldstein, Federal Ordering,
supra note 47. For criticism of the theory, see Note, The "Copying-Misappropriation"
Distinction: A False Step in the Development of the Sears-Compco Pre-emption Doctrine, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1448-49 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Note, Copying-Misappro-
priation].
76. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
77. "In one sense, the misappropriation doctrine was a solution in search of a problem;
the new technology of recording provided it." Patterson, Private Copyright and Public
Communication: Free Speech Endangered, 28 VAND. L.REv. 1161, 1196 (1975).
78. Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 281 (2d Cir. 1929).
79. See Price, supra note 68.
80. Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 430, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443, 451 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
81. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 796,
101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 492 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
82. The courts were, perhaps, misled by the relaxation of the requirement of competi-
tion for "passing off." See note 55 and accompanying text supra. The diversion of another's
goodwill to a non-competing product may still injure that goodwill-if the product is inferior,
for instance-and the public may be misled as to the sponsorship of the product. Misappropri-
ation by a non-competitor produces no injury or confusion of this kind.
tion "a right, like copyright, valid as against the whole world," 83 and thus
brought the doctrine squarely within the objections voiced by Brandeis and
Hand. The aphorism that "one may not reap where he has not sown,"
though "[piersuasive and appealing. . ., [by] its very piquancy warns of
the need for thorough examination. When the jurist becomes too impas-
sioned, and his rhetoric too colorful, he may be easy prey for elliptical
logic. "84
In 1964 Hand's theory of constitutional preemption appeared to win
Supreme Court approval in the companion cases Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co. 85 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 86 In both cases
the Court threw out injunctions issuedby the court of apeals that prohibited
the copying of unpatented light fixtures, finding such protection repugnant
to "the federal policy . . . of allowing free access to copy whatever the
federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain." 87 The
language of the Court seemed to admit no exceptions: "Today we have
held . . . that when an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright,
state law may not forbid others to copy that article. " I' Nevertheless, while
the decisions were not without impact, 89 "[lower state and federal courts
.. largely refused to credit [Sears and Compco] with the breadth they
appear to demand . ". . ."I' Especially in the record piracy cases, which
dominated misappropriation case law in the period, when faced with a
situation in which the need for relief was clear, the courts found ways to
circumvent the preemption argument. Some held that sale of records was
not a divestitive publication on the grounds that each sale involved an
implied promise by the buyer not to use the record competitively. 9' The
83. Goldstein, Federal Ordering, supra note 47, at 58.
84. 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 50, § 60.3, at 508-09.
85. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
86. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
87. Id. at 237.
88. Id. The actual holdings were much narrower. Both cases dealt with items patentable
in theory but not measuring up to Patent Office standards of "novelty," a criterion that does
not need to be met to qualify for a copyright. In both cases the lower court had based its
decision on a finding that consumers were likely to be confused as to the manufacturer of the
item. The Supreme Court observed that confusion was more properly remedied by the
requirement of adequate labeling than by a blanket injunction. Id. at 238. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Harlan suggested that Sears and Compco should not be read as precluding
injunctions on copying as the appropriate response to intentional passing off. "Vindication of
the paramount federal interest at stake does not require a State to tolerate such specifically
oriented predatory business practices." Id. at 239. The discrepancy between actual and
purported holdings gave rise to considerable confusion. Thus, while one commentator
remarked that "[e]ven the calloused conscience of a Sears and Compco court is outraged by
palming off practices," ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY LAW FOR THE GENERAL BUSINESS CONSUMER § 6.20, at 6-13 (1973), another
believed the decisions had denied states the "passing off" doctrine. Patterson, Private
Copyright, supra note 77, at 1195.
89. See, e.g., Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964);
International Tape Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gerstein, 344 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1972), vacated, 494
F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1974); Herald Publishing Co. v. Florida Antennavision, Inc., 173 So. 2d 469
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). One court went so far as to find preemption of non-writings. See
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967) (plaintiff had
invented Paladin character later used in TV western).
90. Goldstein, Federal Ordering, supra note 47, at 65. For an excellent criticism of
Sears and Compco , see Comment, Preemption of State Unfair Competition Protection under
the Proposed Copyright Revision, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 118-21 (1969).
91. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878,252 N.Y.S.2d 553
most frequent means used by the courts to distinguish Sears and Compco,
however, was to draw a distinction between "copying" and "misappropri-
ation." Thus, it was contended that "there is a vital distinction between
imitating an unprotected item . . . and the actual appropriation of
another's work product, skill and investment. ... 92 This "conceptual-
ly slippery distinction" 93 was invoked in numerous record piracy cases
94
and a few other decisions.
95
In Goldstein v. California96 the Court rendered .the distinction un-
necessary by holding that states are free to protect published "writings"
that do not fall within the scope of the federal copyright law. According to
Goldstein, no legislative intent that a type of work remain freely copyable
may be inferred from its exclusion from statutory coverage; rather such
works may be deemed to be of purely local importance and proper subjects
of state protection. On the other hand, "a conflict would develop if a State
attempted to protect that which Congress intended to be free from restraint
or to free that which Congress had protected." 97
(Sup. Ct. 1964). Before Sears and Compco a controversy had already developed over
whether publication is determined by state or federal law. Since "[d]ivergent definitions of
publication under state and federal law can result in inconsistent patterns of protection for
constitutionally protectable works," Note, Goldstein v. California: Validity of State
Copyright under the Copyright and Supremacy Clauses, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1196, 1198-99
(1974) logic seems to demand that it be treated as a federal question. Nevertheless, the weight
of authority appears to be that it is a matter of state law. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury
Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955); M. NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 51.1.
92. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Spies, 167 U.S.P.Q. 492, 495 (Civ. Ct. Ill.
1970).
93. Note, Copying-Misappropriation, supra note 75, at 1461. The distinction is real
but unavailing, since all copying involves misappropriation. An example may help clarify the
matter: P publishes a book under a license from A, the author, and C prints and sells
copies-at a slightly lower price, since he pays no license fee. If the book is copyrighted, A
has a cause of action for infringement and P one for misappropriation. If the book is not
copyrighted, however, both actions fail. C is still guilty of misappropriation but has done only
what he "had every right to do under the federal [copyright] laws." 326 U.S. at 231. In the
record piracy cases, the copying-misappropriation distinction does not affect the basic
issue, which is the scope of federal preemption under Sears-Compco.
94. See, e.g., Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1972); Mercury
Record Productions, Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Wis. 1973);
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erikson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1970); Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 II1. App. 2d 439, 264 N.E.2d 874 (1970); Liberty/UA, Inc. v.
Eastern Tape Corp., II N.C. App. 20, 180 S.E.2d 414 (1971).
95. See, e.g., Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publications, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603 (C.D.
Cal. 1967) (typography protected); Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 141
U.S.P.Q. 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), rev'don othergrounds,22App. Div. 2d 778,254N.Y.S.2d
36 (1964); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc.
2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
96. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
97. Id. at 559. For discussion of the system of 'statutory preemption" established by
Goldstein, see Comment, Sound Recordings' Copyright: The Disc Dilemma, 36 U. PiTr. L.
REV. 887 (1975); Note, Goldstein v. California: A New Outlook for the Misappropriatiom
Doctrine, 8 U.S.F.L. REV. 199 (1973). Goldstein's moderation of Sears and Compco has
generally been welcomed, but the decision has not wholly escaped criticism. See Goldstein,
'Inconsistent Premises" and the "Acceptable Middle Ground ": A Comment on Goldstein v.
California, 21 BULL. CR. Soc. 25 (1973); Note, Goldstein v. California: Validity of State
Copyright under the Copyright and Supremacy Clauses, 25 HASTINGs L.J. 1196 (1974). A
theory of statutory preemption was applied prior to Goldstein in Tape Industries Ass'n of
America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D. Cal. 1970). One court continued to apply the
copying-misappropriation distinction even after Goldstein. See CBS, Inc. v. Melody
Recording, Inc., 134 N.J. Super. 368, 341 A.2d 348 (1975). Although Goldstein upheld a state
anti-piracy statute, its rationale applies equally to protection at common law. See Jacobs v.
Robitaille, 406 F. Supp. 1145 (D.N.H. 1976); Gai Audio of New York, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 27
Md. App. 172, 340 A.2d 736 (1975).
IV. Misappropriation and the Revised Copyright Act
A. The Copyright Revision Act of 1976
The need for a thorough revision of the copyright law had long been
recognized. 98 Copyright legislation had been continuously before the
Congress since 1964, but until September, 1976, a series of controversies
over specific provisions frustrated attempts at passage of an omnibus
revision bill. Successful resolution of some of the controversies was finally
achieved only by resort to a system of compensation completely alien to the
copyright theory that has prevailed for over two hundred years: compul-
sory licensing.
99
Under the new law, copyright protection begins at the creation of the
work and lasts the life of the author plus fifty years. 1o Although the length
of the term has been the subject of dispute, the advantages of the life-plus
form are clear: no author is deprived of the benefit of his work during his
lifetime; all works of one author enter the public domain simultaneously;
and users need not in most cases concern themselves with the often difficult
question of when a work was first published.
98. "It is startling to realize that the program for a general revision of the copyright law
actually got underway. . . in 1924, and produced four distinct legislative efforts before WW
I." Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcom. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adminis-
tration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94 Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 36, pt. 1, at 99
(1975) (remarks of Ms. Ringer) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 22231. The need for a
new law has generally been attributed to the rapid advancement of communications technol-
ogy. See Comment, Copyrights: Concurrence, Revision, and Photocopying-Williams &
Wilkins Company v. United States, a "'Holding Operation" by the United States Court of
Claims, 79 DiCK. L. REV. 260, 262-64 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Copyright:
Concurrence, Revision, and Photocopying]. The most recent, and finally successful, effort to
revise the copyright law began in 1955 with appropriations for a comprehensive program of
research and studies by the Copyright Office as the groundwork for revision. For a brief
history, see H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47-49(1976) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REPORT 14761.
99. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
"Jukebox exemption. "--Under the 1909 Act owners of jukeboxes pay no royalties for
the renditions of musical compositions given by their machines, 17 U.S.C. § I(e). Efforts to
repeal this section produced one of the most heated controversies. Under the new law, such
renditions constitute performances, but the jukebox proprietor may avoid liability by
payment of an $8 royalty fee per year per machine to the Copyright Royalty Commission,
which will distribute the fees to claimant copyright owners. 17 U.S.C.A. § 116 (Supp. Dec.
1976).
Secondary transmissions. -Passage of the copyright revision may have received deci-
sive impetus from the Supreme Court holding in Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S.
394 (1974), that retransmission of over-the-air television broadcasts by cable television did not
constitute infringement. Under the new law, cable television systems, in order to be able to
transmit copyrighted program material, must pay royalty fees based on gross receipts. The
Copyright Royalty Commission is responsible for the distribution of fees to copyright
proprietors. 17 U.S.C.A. § Ill (Supp. Dec. 1976).
Phonorecords.-The new law retains the compulsory licensing system of the 1909 Act,
17 U.S.C. §§ l(e), 101(e), raising the per record royalty to 2 '/,4 and imposing certain
restrictions on the nature and use of the recordings that may be made under the license. 17
U.S.C.A. § 115 (Supp. Dec. 1976).
Public Broadcasting.--The Senate version of the revision included an amendment
granting to public broadcasting a compulsory license for use of non-dramatic and musical
works, subject to payment of royalties to the Copyright Royalty Tribunal established by that
bill. See S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 100-103 (1975). The section as enacted,
however, conforms to the House version, and merely provides guidelines for the
development of private arrangements between copyright owners and public broadcasting. 17
U.S.C.A. § 118 (Supp. Dec. 1976).
100. Id. § 302. In the case of an anonymous or pseudonymous work or one made for hire,
the term is either 75 years from publication or 100 years from creation, whichever expires
first.
The new copyright law gives express statutory recognition for the first
time to the judicial doctrine of "fair use," one of the most important and
well-established exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright propri-
etors.' 0 ' In particular, criteria are suggested to guide the determination
whether a particular instance of copying constitutes fair use or in-
fringement. 102
The new law covers "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression."' 0 3 A work is fixed if its tangible
embodiment is "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than a transitory duration." 01 Despite the apparent breadth of coverage, it
is not intended that the Act exhaust the constitutional power of Congress,
but rather that a degree of flexibility be retained to avoid freezing the scope
of copyrightable material.'0°
The exclusive rights of copyright owners under the new law are
substantially the same as under the 1909 Act, except that the right of
performance is no longer qualified by a "for profit" requirement. They
include the right to reproduce the copyrighted work in whole or any
substantial part, the right to prepare derivative works based on the
copyrighted work, and the right to distribute copies to the public. 106 In
addition, owners of copyrights in works other than sound recordings have
the exclusive right to perform or display their works in public. 1
07
101. See generally 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 145 (1976).
102. [F]actors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (Supp. Dec. 1976). A closely related problem is treated by section 108,
which prescribes guidelines for photocopying by libraries and archives. For background on
the issue of photocopying, which developed into one of the major controversies of copyright
revision, see Comment, Copyright: Concurrence, Revision and Photocopying, supra note 98.
103. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (Supp. Dec.1976).
Works of authorship include [but are not limited to] the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choregraphic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audio-visual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
Id. §§ 101, 102.
104. Id. § 101.
105. H.R. REPORT 1476, supra note 98, at 51.
106. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (Supp. Dec. 1976). As section 109 makes clear, the right to
distribute ceases as to any particular copy when the copyright proprietor has parted with
ownership of it.
107. Id. §§ 106, 114. A major effort was conducted by the representatives of music
performers to have included a limited performance right, in the form of a compulsory license,
for copyrighted sound recordings. See Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R.
6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser.
8, pt. 3, at 1384-1419 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 4347], and Hearings on
H.R. 2223, supra note 98, pt. 2, at 1298-1392. The proposals were rejected, however, as
needing further study. Section 114(d) requires the Register of Copyrights to submit a report on
One of the strongest arguments for revision of the 1909 Act was "the
need to avoid the arbitrary and unjust forfeitures"' 0 8 resulting from minor
deviations from the "monstrous formalities'0 it prescribes. Under the
new law, copyright protection is not forfeited by omission of copyright
notice, or defective notice, on a relatively small number of copies, or even
on a large number if registration is made within five years and a reasonable
effort is made to add notice to distributed copies. 0 A person who infringes
a copyright in reliance on the omission of notice incurs no liability if he can
prove that he was misled by the omission, though he may nevertheless be
required by the court to account for profits arising from the in-
fringement. "'1
As under the 1909 Act, registration is a prerequisite for suit, and
failure to register does not forfeit protection." 2 Under the new law, deposit
for registration purposes and deposit for the Library of Congress are
separate matters, and in neither case will noncompliance result in forfeiture
of copyright." 3
B. Preemption of State Law Equivalent to Copyright
1. Background.-In his 1961 Report, the Register of Copyrights
proposed that the new copyright law provide for protection to begin at
"public dissemination" and last for a term of twenty-eight years, renew-
able for a second term of forty-eight years. The proposal met "a flood of
opposition; there was strong support for a single Federal copyright system
with protection commencing upon the creation of a work and ending 50
years after the author's death."' 14 The Copyright Office was forced to
reconsider its position and eventually adopted both proposals. The relevant
sections of the Act have remained essentially unchanged since the first
draft of the bill.
The legislative history 15 identifies four basic objectives to be attained
by the establishment of a single federal system:
(1) To achieve national uniformity. The inability of individual states
to make adequate provision for the protection of authors, observed by
the matter in 1978. Section 114(b) makes clear that the owner of a copyright in a sound
recording is protected only against the duplication of the actual sounds fixed in the recording,
not against imitation of those sounds.
108. H.R. REPORT 1476, supra note 98, at 143.
109. Hearings on H.R. 2223, supra note 98, at 107.
110. 17 U.S.C.A. § 405(a) (Supp. Dec. 1976).
Ill. Id. § 405(b).
112. Id. §§ 408, 411. If application for registration has been made and registration has
been refused by the Copyright Office, the applicant is entitled to bring suit for infringement if
a copy of the complaint is sent to the Registrar, who may at his or her option become a party to
the action on the issue of registrability. Id. § 411. The 1909 Act required the applicant to bring
an action against the Register of Copyrights to compel registration before an infringement suit
could be brought. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co.,
Inc., 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958).
113. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 407, 408 (Supp. Dec. 1976).
114. Hearings, H.R. 2223, supra note 98, at 101.
115. H.R. REPORT 1476, supra note 98, at 129-30.
James Madison in 1789,' "' has become many times more serious with the
advance of communications technology.
(2) To reduce the reliance on publication as a standard. With the
development of the non-print media, "[t]he concept of publication has now
become outdated and slightly ridiculous."117
(3) To implement the "limited times" provision of the Constitution.
Although the provision is not technically binding on the states, it expresses
a wise policy. Historians and other scholars will benefit from the increased
availability of unpublished manuscripts that under the common law re-
ceived perpetual protection.
(4) To conform with international practice. No other country has a
dual common-law and statutory law system. "In an era when copyrighted
works can be disseminated instantaneously to every country on the globe,
the need for effective international copyright relations, and the concomi-
tant need for national uniformity, assume ever greater importance.""18
2. Scope of Preemption.-Section 301(a) represents a congres-
sional attempt at legislative resolution of the natural law-positive law
dichotomy that has eluded judicial clarification for two hundred years. It
provides that all rights equivalent to copyright in works within the subject
matter of copyright are governed exclusively by federal law; to the extent
that they grant such rights in such works, state laws are abrogated. " 9 Any
concurrent exercise of copyright power at state and federal level is
effectively precluded. The authors of the legislation believe that even more
is accomplished: "As long as a work fits within one of the general subject
matter categories of sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the States from
protecting it even if it fails to achieve Federal statutory copyright because it
is too minimal or lacking in originality to qualify .... .120 Strictly
speaking, this is not quite true; since the scope of subject matter covered by
the statute is described in terms of a standard of originality, works lacking
in originality are ipso facto beyond its preemptive reach. 12' It remains to be
116. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 309 (B.F. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
117. Hearings on H.R. 2223, supra note 98, at 107.
118. H.R. REPORT 1476, supra note 98, at 130.
119. On or after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression
and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and
103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpub-
lished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to
any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or
statutes of any State.
17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a) (Supp. Dec. 1976). Section 103 deals with compilations and derivative
works.
120. H.R. REPORT 1476, supra note 98, at 131.
121. The phrase "and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
sections 102 and 103" must, if it is not wholly nugatory, limit in some way "works of
authorship." If the limitation is originality, as required by section 102, then the scope of
preemption is similarly limited. If, on the other hand, use of the word "specified" implies
limitation to categories actually listed, as suggested by the House report, then the subject
matter of copyright, which is not limited to those categories (see note 103 supra) will include
works not subject to preemption at all, and the primary purpose of the section-to preclude
concurrent state and federal protection-is defeated. Since section 301(b) purports to save
seen, of course, whether courts will read the section so literally, in the face
of its authors' expressed intent and in the light of the free access policy
advanced by Sears and Compco, or whether states will even attempt to
protect such materials.
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3. Preservation of Certain Areas for State Protection .- Section
30 l(b) of the new law is intended to clarify what areas are outside the scope
of preemption and may properly be the subject of state protection. Clause
(1) exempts "subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, including works of
authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 123 Clause (2)
exempts "any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced
before January 1, 1978.
' 124
Clause (3) has undergone several changes. As first submitted to the
Congress in 1965, it covered
activities violating rights that are not equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106, including breaches of contract,
breaches of trust, invasion of privacy, defamation, and decep-
tive trade practices such as passing off and false
representation. 125
The examples were intended "to illustrate rights and remedies that are
different in nature from the rights comprised in a copyright and that may
continue to be protected under State common law or statute." 1 26 Misap-
propriation was deliberately omitted from the list of illustrations on the
grounds that it was "nothing more than copyright protection under another
name. ' 1
27
During the 1975 House subcommittee hearings, the Assistant Com-
missioner of Patents, expressing the views of the Commerce Department,
proposed that the language of the subsection be modified to exempt
"activities which otherwise constitute unfair competition by ...
misappropriation',:128
[W]e agree with the preemption of the State laws as to copyright
type protection but feel that the bill should not upset the present
protection that is available under State statutes and the common
law of unfair competition. We specifically mentioned the Inter-
national News case in this connection. That case represents an
example of one area which we particularly feel should not be
preempted by the copyright law because the copyright law does
from preemption everything not covered by 301(a), see notes 123-25 and accompanying text
supra, preemption as to works lacking originality will have to be predicated on something
other than the terms of the Act itself. The legislative intent expressed in the House report and
the federal conflicts doctrine of Goldstein should suffice. See text at note 97 supra.
122. Legal or business forms may furnish the subject matter for such an attempt. See
Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958).
123. 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(b)(1) (Supp. Dec. 1976).
124. Id. § 301(b)(2).
125. Hearings on H.R. 4347, supra note 107, at 10.
126. H.R. REPORT 1476, supra note 98, at 132.
127. S. REP. No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 167 (1974).
128. Hearings on H.R. 2223, supra note 98, at 165.
not provide the same nature of protection that the International
News case decision does.
12 9
The Commerce Department proposals were accepted and subsection (3)
was amended to exclude from preemption any rights against misappropria-
tion that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright. 3 ' Subsequent reports recognized that
'[m]isappropriation' is not necessarily synonymous with
copyright infringement . ... For example, state law should
have the flexibility to afford a remedy (under traditional princi-
ples of equity) against a consistent pattern of unauthorized
appropriation by a competitor of the facts (i.e., not the literary
expression) constituting 'hot' news, whether in the traditional
mold of [INS], or in the newer form of data updates from
scientific, business, or financial data bases."'
Objection to the new wording was raised by Senator Hugh Scott
during Senate consideration of the bill in February 1976. Its inclusion,
Scott declared, would mean "that, for example, an author who has
purposefully chosen not to protect his book under the Federal Copyright
Act, could stop another person from copying the book by bringing a State
law suit for an injunction alleging misappropriation of the author's
work.' 1 32 In support of his position, Scott introduced into the record a
letter from the Justice Department, which maintained that "sanction[ing]
129. Id. at 170 (remarks of Mr. Tegtmeyer). The quoted passage was in response to the
question from Representative Kastenmeier: "Do you not understand those that have thus far
designed the copyright bill to specifically exclude State unfair competition laws for a
reason?" Id. The conversation continued:
Mr. KASTENMEIER. On that point, have you conferred with the Copyright
Office or any other Federal Agencies? Do you find them in agreement with your
position?
Mr. TEGTMEYER. We have been in contact with some other Federal agencies
and in contact with the Copyright Office, as well. We have not found agreement
with our position on all points.
[Mr. Kastenmeier yielded.]
Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Tegtmeyer, I find myself in somewhat of adilemma; who
actually speaks for the administration?
Mr. TEGTMEYER. Our testimony only purports to speak for the Department of
Commerce.
Id.
130. Id. at 176.
131. H.R. REPORT 1476, supra note 98, at 132. The above quoted passage continues:
Likewise, a person having no trust or other relationship with the proprietor of a
computerized data base should not be immunized from sanctions against electron-
ically or cryptographically breaching the proprietor's security arrangements and
accessing the proprietor's data. The unauthorized data access which should be
remediable might also be achieved by the intentional interception of data transmis-
sions by wire, microwave or laser transmissions, or by the common unintentional
means of 'crossed' telephonelines occasioned by errors in switching.
The proprietor of data displayed on the cathode ray tube of a computer
terminal should be afforded protection against unauthorized printouts by third
parties (with or without improper access), even if the data are not copyrightable.
Id. (The above quoted passages are taken verbatim from S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. 116 (1975). For proposals to bring computer programs and data bases explicitly within
the scope of copyright, see Hearings on H.R. 2223, supra note 98, at 2217-26.
132. 122 CONG. REC. 2042 (1976). An author's decision not to copyright his book has no
effect on a state's power to protect it, since the decision neither alters the book's status as a
fixed work of authorship nor affects the question of the protection's equivalence to copyright.
As to a state's power to protect copyrightable works under the Revised Act, see text at notes
155-62 infra.
use of the highly anticompetitive 'misappropriation' theory . . .would
defeat the underlying purpose of the preemption section."' 33 Seven
months later, during floor debate in the House of Representatives, an
amendment was offered striking all examples of permissible varieties of
state protection. It was intended to save section 301 preemption from being
"inadvertently nullified": 134
[i1t would be a serious mistake to cite as an exemption from
preemption the doctrine of 'misappropriation.' The doctrine was
created by the Supreme Court itself in 1922 [sic], and it has
generally been ignored by the Supreme Court itself and by the
lower courts ever since.
Inclusion of a reference to the misappropriation doctrine in
this bill, however, could easily be construed by the courts as
authorizing the States to pass misappropriation laws. We should
not approve such enabling legislation, because a misappropria-
tion law could be so broad as to render the preemption section
meaningless. "I
After assurances were given that the change "in no way [was] attempting
to change the existing state of the law, that is as it may exist in certain States
that have recognized the right of recovery relating to 'misappropria-
tion,' "136 the amendment was accepted by the sponsors of the bill and
agreed to by the House. 1
37
The purpose of the amendment is unclear. If it is based on the premise
that the stricken provisions did in fact constitute "enabling legislation," 1
38
then its authors overlooked their clearly illustrative function. Since only
those rights against misappropriation are saved from preemption that are
not equivalent to the exclusive rights protected by a copyright, the
boundary of the exemption from preemption is defined in the same terms as
133. 122 CONG. REC. 2042 (1976). According to the Justice Department letter, "[tihe
Senate Report states (p. 116) that reproduction of 'the literary expression' itself should be
preempted and should not be able to be prohibited under the 'misappropriation' theory; yet
that is what inclusion of the term 'misappropriation' in paragraph (3) would prohibit." Id. at
2043. Since the Senate report "states" nothing of the kind, the Justice Department assertion
appears to be based on the distinction made in the report between literary expression and facts
or "hot" news. See quotation in text at note 131 supra. As interpreted by the Justice
Department, this passage means that verbatim copying of uncopyrighted news dispatches is
always permissible, even though appropriation of the substance of the dispatches is a proper
occasion for relief at state law. The authors of the Senate report obviously intended no such
absurdity; their distinction points out merely that it is the appropriation of the facts that is the
essence of the wrong. (In INS the opinion does not reveal whether the dispatches had been
copied or reworded, and the Court correctly regarded the question as irrelevant. 248 U.S. at
234.) Thus, it is no objection to the misappropriation doctrine that its application may, in
certain cases, prohibit reproduction of the literary expression itself.
134. 122 CONG. REC. 10910 (1976).
135. Id. The amendment was offered by Representative Sieberling, who noted that it
was "strongly supported by the Justice Department." Id.
136. Id. (quote from a question by Representative Railsback).
137. Representative Railsback was satisfied by assurances that the amendment would
not change state law. Representative Kastenmeier noted that the Justice Department had not
made its position known to the committee until the last day of markup, but had no objections.
In view of the fact that the 94th Congress was rapidly nearing its end, the bill's sponsors can
scarcely be faulted for declining to jeopardize passage by raising another controversy; yet the
erratic history of the misappropriation provision can result only in an unfortunate lack of
clarity as to the scope of preemption, which is further aggravated by the absence of any
persuasive explanation for its final deletion.
138. Representative Sieberling apparently thought so: "We are, in effect, adopting a
rather amorphous body of state law and codifying it, in effect." Id.
the scope of preemption itself. The reference to misappropriation has no
independent substantive effect and serves exclusively to clarify the scope
of preemption explicit in section 301(a).
139
Another purpose of the deletion of these provisions, according to
Representative Sieberling, is to "prevent the citing of them as examples in
a statute."'" If they accurately reflect the limitations of preemption,
however, why may they not be cited in a state law as examples of
proscribed practices?' 4' Neither the case law nor the copyright statute itself
furnishes any support for a distinction between statutory and decisional law
with regard to the constitutional propriety of state protection. 142
By far the most likely explanation is that the amendment sprang from
the antipathy of the Justice Department to the misappropriation doctrine.
While the deletion of the illustrative provision may not change the law in a
technical sense, it may nevertheless influence judges grappling with the
concept of equivalence to copyright as they seek guidance in the legislative
history. By pressing its argument at a time when no effective rebuttal was
possible, the Department succeeded to a degree in having its position given
the imprimatur of Congress. There would be little harm done were the
Department's position well-reasoned and sound, but this is not the case. On
the contrary, in the Department's letter to Senator Scott, 43 the nature of the
misappropriation doctrine is misrepresented, ' its anticompetitive effects
are exaggerated, 145 and the balance of case law for and against it is
139. The Senate report itself describes 301(b) as "the obverse" of 301(a): "It sets out, in
broad terms and without necessarily being exhaustive, some of the principal areas of
protection that preemption would not prevent the States from protecting." S. REP. No. 473,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. 115 (1975).
140. 122 CONG. REc. 10910 (1976).
141. The Justice Department letter (see note 133 and accompanying text supra), citing
N.Y. General Business Law § 368-d, observes that New York State has codified the INS
doctrine, thereby conceding that states have the power to provide such protection. 122 CONG.
REC. 2043 (1976). But cf. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW§ 368-d (McKinney 1968) (authorizes injunctive
relief for injury to business reputation).
142. Since preemption extends to both "the common law or statutes of any State," 17
U.S.C.A. § 301(a) (Supp. Dec. 1976), exemption must extend to both as well.
143. See note 133 and accompanying text supra.
144. INS is identified in the letter as the source of the misappropriation doctrine, but
analysis is limited to the statement that "[t]he Court's theory was that defendant's conduct
was unlawful because it sought to 'reap where it has not sown.' " 122 CONG. REC. 2043 (1976).
"The effect of the theory is boundless-it is potentially applicable each time a person engages
in conduct that imitates some work that was developed at another's expense." Id. While it is
true that some overzealous courts relaxed the requirement for competition between the
parties (see notes 81-84 and accompanying text supra), they continued to require either
commercial injury or a recognizable property right. Compare Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v.
Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y. S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (defendant
made unauthorized, low-quality recordings of plaintiff's performances), and Ettore v. Philco
Tel. Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956) (defendant used old film showing plaintiff
losing to Joe Louis), with Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., It App. Div. 2d 47, 201 N.Y.S.2d
632 (1960) (Glenn Miller "sound" not protectable). In more recent decisions, moreover, the
courts have begun to show a somewhat greater awareness of the role of competition in the
misappropriation doctrine. See Gai Audio of New York, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 27 Md. App. 172,
340 A.2d 736 (1975); CBS, Inc. v. Melody Recording, Inc., 134 N.J. Super. 368, 341 A.2d 348
(1975).
145. According to the Justice Department, the INS doctrine might be used to prohibit
"the use by a doctor of a surgical technique developed by another doctor," 122 CONG. REC.
2043 (1976), an assertion for which there is not the slightest authority. The misappropriation
doctrine, according to the letter, "may be used contrary to copyright and antitrust policies to
sustain perpetual monopolies over printed matter, and contrary to patent and antitrust
policies to sustain perpetual monopolies over alleged inventions which do not qualify for
deceptively described. 146
4. Two- Tiered Analysis for Preemption. -The new law establishes
a two-tiered test for preemption: first, whether the work in question is
within the subject matter of copyright as defined by sections 102 and 103;
and, second, whether the right proposed to be protected is equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights specified by section 106. As was the case with
publication, logic would appear to dictate that these are federal questions,
but the courts decided otherwise with regard to publication and may again.
The argument for a uniform federal standard is much stronger now,
however, as a result of the Sears and Compco decisions and in light of the
fact that national uniformity is one of the expressed objectives of the new
law. 147
The question of subject matter breaks down into two parts: fixation
and original authorship. 148 Fixation does not at this point appear to be a
matter of controversy, except perhaps with regard to certain types of
computer materials. '4 9 There is every reason to believe, however, that as
communication systems become still more sophisticated fixation will
become more difficult to determine. Since the new law makes clear that
patent protection." Id. This is entirely false. In the patent area, Sears and Compco have
established federal preemption (as the letter itself points out), and those decisions are
completely unaffected by the copyright law. In the great majority of cases where printed
matter is concerned, state law will be preempted; and in no case is the result a monopoly, since
others are always free to create identical materials so long as they do it with their own skill,
labor and investment. Moreover, relief against misappropriation is seldom if ever perpetual,
since its object is merely to safeguard the plaintiff's right to a fair return on his efforts. (The
letter fails to mention that in INS, the only misappropriation case it cites, the injunction
upheld by the Court prohibited copying for only a few hours-until the news was no longer
"hot." 248 U.S. at 245-46). It is simply not true that -[a]ny copy[ing] of copyrightable subject
matter that has not been federally protected could be prohibited" under the misappropriation
doctrine as a result of its inclusion as an example in section 301(b), 122 CONG. REC. 2043
(1976), and the Justice Department statement to that effect demonstrates lamentable disre-
gard for accuracy.
146. As authority for its assertion that the misappropriation doctrine is against the weight
of authority, the Justice Department letter cites seven cases. Four are decisions of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals under Judge Learned Hand. See notes 69-76 and accompanying text
supra. In Triangle Pub., Inc. v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 46 F. Supp. 198(D. Mass.
1942), the opinion was expressed that the Supreme Court would overrule INS if given the
opportunity, but the holding of that three and a half decade old case is limited to construing
state law. CBS, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967), is cited as authority for the
proposition that INS was in fact overruled by Sears and Compco. The Justice Department
fails to mention, however, that in Goldstein the Supreme Court expressly limited Sears and
Compco to the patent field. 412 U.S. at 569-70. Cited to the effect that "misappropriation is
"contrary to the great weight of authority' " (122 CONG. REC. 2043 (1976)), West Point Mfg.
Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1955), deals with product simulation and
presages Sears and Compco; neither INS nor misappropriation is expressly mentioned,
although there is dictum buried deep in a footnote that could be interpreted as a repudiation.
Id. at 599 n.4.
Contrary to the letter's implication, the New York courts have not been almost alone in
applying the misappropriation doctrine. See, e.g., Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 80 F.2d
575 (9th Cir. 1935), rev 'dfor want of jurisdiction, 299 U.S. 269 (1936); Veatch v. Wagner, 116
F. Supp. 904 (D. Alas. 1953); Grove Press, Inc. v. Collector's Publications, Inc., 264 F. Supp.
603 (C.D. Cal. 1967); McCord v. Plotnick, 108 Cal. App. 2d 392, 239 P.2d 32 (1951); Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 III. App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d 874 (1970); Gai Audio of New York,
Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 27 Md. App. 172,340 A.2d 736(1975); CBS, Inc. v. Melody Recording, Inc.,
134 N.J. Super. 368,341 A.2d 348 (1975); Pottstown Daily News Pub. Co. v. Pottstown Broad.
Co., 411 Pa. 383, 192 A.2d 657 (1963). Seealso Jacob & Jane Zook, Inc. v. Hex Barn, 65 Lane.
13 (Pa. C.P. 1975) (appropriation of hex sign designs).
147. See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
148. See note 103 and accompanying text supra.
149. See note 131 supra.
states are free to provide protection in the nature of copyright to unfixed
works, a re-examination is in order of those cases that held, relying
primarily on Sears and Compco, that state protection of such matters as
character1 50 and voice' 51 was preempted. Impetus should also be given to
efforts to achieve protection of conversation, 52 improvisations' 53 and
other spontaneous creative expressions. State protection of a performer's
right in sound recordings is, for the time being at least, precluded.' 54
Even if the subject matter in question is within the scope of copyright,
a state may still offer relief if the right thus protected is not equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights comprised by a copyright, but "[d]etermining
the equivalency to copyright of nominally different state-protected rights is
a treacherous task . ... "155 In the case of misappropriation, the task is
made particularly difficult by the absence, in many cases, of any collateral
wrong, such as breach of trust or confidentiality, or invasion of privacy. If
a defendant has simply reproduced and sold copies of the plaintiff's
copyrightable work product, how can it be argued that section 301
preemption does not apply? The answer lies in the fact that valid distinc-
tions can be made between the exclusive rights of a copyright owner, valid
against the whole world, and the limited right of a commercial enterprise to
be free from unfair competitive practices that deprive it of a fair return on
its work and investment.
Since relief under the misappropriation doctrine is afforded only
against acts of competitors, no "exclusive right" is being protected. In this
respect, rights against misappropriation are fundamentally different from
those protected by copyright. It does not follow, however, that they can
never be preempted, for the doctrine is based on considerations of equity
and fairness and these must be considered in the light of the copyright law.
Thus an author who deliberately refrains from obtaining a copyright, or
who through gross carelessness forfeits his protection, has no recourse to
misappropriation relief. Indeed, under the Revised Act, an author has no
150. CBS, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967), discussed in Comment,
Copyright Preemption and Character Values: The Paladin Case as an Extension of Sears and
Compco, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1968). Relief has been granted when the character was
uniquely associated with a particular actor and constituted his main stock-in-trade. Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures Co., 172 U.S.P.Q. 541 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972) (suit by Bela Lugosi's heirs);
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (suit by heirs of Stan
Laurel and Oliver Hardy). See generally Lang, Performance and the Right of the Performing
Artist, 21 COPYRIGHT L. SYM. 69 (1974). For a thorough discussion of literary characters as a
subject of unfair competition, see Brylawski, Protection of Characters-Sam Spade Revi-
sited, 22 BULL. CR. Soc. 77 (1974).
151. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970) (advertisement
imitated Nancy Sinatra's "These Boots are Made for Walkin' "); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Shirley Booth's "Hazel" voice closely imitated). Cf.
Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1 st Cir. 1962) (Bert Lahr's voice protected). For a
discussion of these cases and protection of performers' style in general, see 52 DENVER L.J.
561 (1975).
152. See Williams, The Protectibility of Spontaneous Oral Conversations Via Common-
Law Copyright, 13 IDEA 263 (1969).
153. See Nelson, Jazz and Copyright: A Study in Improvised Protection, 21 ASCAP
COPYRIGHT L. SYM. 35 (1974).
154. See note 107 supra.
155. Goldstein, Federal Ordering, supra note 47, at 53.
need to "obtain" a copyright; it comes into being with the creation of the
work. 156 The acts necessary to forfeit protection, moreover, are such as to
create a powerful inference of intentional abandonment. 157 Therefore,
misappropriation relief will be available with respect to copyrightable
subject matter only when the nature of the plaintiff's enterprise or the
nature of the appropriated material makes copyright protection either
inadequate or unfeasible.
An appropriation of a person's work product is only unfair if it
interferes with his right to a fair return. If a defendant's practice renders the
plaintiff's work product worthless, "or so little profitable as in effect to cut
off the service [or other product] by rendering the cost prohibitive in
comparison with the return," 15 s the end result is not greater accessibility to
the work, but rather its disappearance altogether. This will happen when
there is a substantial disproportion between the labor and investment of the
plaintiff in creating the material and that of the defendant in appropriating
it. Thus, the goal of greater productivity and accessibility is consistent with
the standards of fairness applicable in misappropriation cases.
A reduction of commercial value by unauthorized copying is most
likely in cases involving "certain types of services of a fragile character,
rather than products, whose commercial exploitation without destruction
by immediate imitation is difficult."' 59 These are also the cases in which
copyright protection is most likely to be inappropriate. In such cases the
defendant's conduct is more probably a "consistent pattern of unau-
thorized appropriation"' 60 and not an occasional borrowing. As observed
by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion to Sears and Compco, states
have a legitimate interest in prohibiting such intentional, "predatory"
commercial practices. 161 Effective relief may be provided in such cases by
temporary protection, lasting only the brief commercial life of the work
and consistent with the constitutional "limited Times" policy.
In sum, when dealing with works of evanescent value, reliance on
copyright is likely to be impracticable, but there are no persuasive reasons
for denying relief. Congress cannot take into consideration every business
circumstance, and a copyright law filled with special provisions to meet
each situation would be neither workable nor desirable. An interstitial or
remedial basis of relief is needed to deal with problems not contemplated
by the lawmakers. 162 That function is ably filled by the doctrine of
misappropriation.
156. 17 U.S.C.A. § 302 (Supp. Dec. 1976). See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
157. See notes 110-111 and accompanying text supra.
158. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 241 (1918).
159. Rahl, The Right to "Appropriate " Trade Values, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 56, 57 (1962). The
classic example is, of course, "hot" news as in INS.
160. H.R. REPORT 1476, supra note 98, at 132.
161. 376 U.S. at 239.
162. The drafters of the new law appear to have relied to some extent on the availability
of such interstitial relief. Among the very few objectors to section 301 were representatives of
printers, who were concerned about its impact on the common industry practice of preparing
preliminary sketches, designs and copy to give the customer an idea of the finished product.
V. Conclusion
Subsequent to the landmark case of Millar v. Taylor 63 over two
hundred years ago, the law of copyright rested on a dual foundation:
natural law and positive law. Advocates of the natural law theory believed
that an author's rights in his work derive from his labor in creating it. Their
opponents contended that copyright is a creature of statutory law. In the
twentieth century the debate turned on the question of federal preemp-
tion-the positive law advocates arguing that the Constitution precluded
all state protection, the natural law camp contending that common-law
protection extended to cover all areas not actually subject to federal
copyright.
The focal point of the controversy has been the misappropriation
doctrine, first articulated by the Supreme Court in International News
Service v. Associated Press.164 Grounded in the judicial conscience, the
doctrine accords creators of intangible trade values the right, enforceable
against competitors, to a fair opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their
industry. Not until the Supreme Court decision in Goldstein v. Califor-
nia, 165 however, was it finally established beyond doubt that state and
federal copyright powers are concurrent and that states may accord
protection to intellectual property in a manner consistent with federal
policy.
Under the Copyright Act of 1976166 the boundaries of federal preemp-
tion are finally made explicit. All state law granting protection equivalent
to copyright to works within the scope of the Act is abrogated. The
misappropriation doctrine survives the Act in its original form, limited to
competitive situations. Although liberalization of notice requirements will
greatly reduce the need for an alternative form of protection, in the case of
works of evanescent commercial value, misappropriation is a particularly
appropriate basis for relief.
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"[A]I too frequently an unprincipled customer .. will take the preliminary design and copy
• . .and have the job printed by another for a price which will not include the cost of the initial
preparatory work .. " Hearings on H.R. 4347, supra note 107, at 1099. The burden of
preparing extra copies for deposit with the Copyright Office and of having to sue in federal
court was, they contended, an undue hardship on small printing firms. The drafters, however,
found that such "essentially procedural rather than substantive" problems did not warrant a
special exemption. "Moreover, subsection (b) ...will preserve other legal grounds on
which the printers can protect themselves against 'pirates' under State laws." HR. REPORT
No. 1476, supra note 98, at 131. A cause of action for misappropriation should lie against the
unfairly competing printer.
163. 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
164. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
165. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
166. 17 U.S.C.A. (Supp. Dec. 1976).

